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INTRODUCTION
Jack and Jifl went up the hill,
to steal a pail of water,
Both were caught and sentenced to jail,
But Jack came out two years later.
Why? Assume that both Jack and Jill's cases are identical
in facts, procedure, jury composition, and verdict. The only
relevant difference is that Jack is a man and Jill is a woman.
Statistically, men are more likely to recidivate than women,1
and under a sentencing system called evidence-based sentenc-
ing, the judge agrees that Jack is more likely to commit another
crime due to his gender. The solution to this prediction? Jack
will spend more time in prison, simply because he is a man.
Evidence-based sentencing is part of a growing trend of
using actuarial risk assessments in the criminal justice sys-
tem.2 Evidence-based sentencing relies on a set of factors,
some of which are relevant to the crime committed but most of
which are based on immutable characteristics outside of the
defendant's control, to predict the probability that a defendant
will recidivate.3 Notwithstanding the constitutionally problem-
atic nature of relying on certain factors, such as sex,4 the sci-
entific validity of such methods is questionable. Although
evidentiary rules do not apply to sentencing, this Note argues
that the admissibility of such evidence in general, and specifi-
1 Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationaliza-
tion of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REv. 803, 863 (2014) ("To give a simple illustra-
tion, if a sentence is based on crime severity plus gender, and these factors
together produce a ten-year sentence for a male when an otherwise-identical
woman would have received seven years, male gender is not solely responsible for
the sentence; crime severity establishes the baseline of seven years. But male
gender is solely responsible for the extra three years.").
2 Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REv. 671, 673 (2015)
("More and more, courts today are adopting the use of risk-assessment tools in
sentencing. These risk-assessment tools take information on recidivism rates for
groups and use them to estimate the risk of recidivism for individuals possessing
those same group characteristics.").
3 The topic of predictive factors of dangerousness recently arose in oral argu-
ments in front of the Supreme Court in Buck v. Davis. Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 31, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2016) (No. 15-8049).
4 The author of this Note would like to point out that actuarial instruments
and researchers tend to use gender and sex interchangeably. These two words,
however, have two different meanings. For the purpose of this Note, sex is biologi-
cally defined, whereas gender is a societal construct. The author also uses the
singular "they" throughout this Note.
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cally Pennsylvania's new sentencing scheme, fails the Daubert
framework.
Part I of this Note provides a background into the charac-
teristics and history of different types of evidence-based sen-
tencing and addresses the arguments for and against its use.
Part II describes the "future dangerousness" standard used in
death penalty sentencing and civil commitments of sexually
violent persons as an analogy to evidence-based sentencing
and argues that evidence-based sentencing must withstand
some type of evidentiary gatekeeping test. Part III subjects evi-
dence-based sentencing to the Daubert test and applies this
test broadly to evidence-based sentencing generally, as well as
specifically to Pennsylvania's Risk Assessment Project.5 Part
IV uses Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to further explain why
evidence-based sentencing should not be used, particularly for
models that include sex and age. Part V briefly addresses cer-
tain penological theories that evidence-based sentencing re-
flects and questions whether evidence-based sentencing is the
appropriate solution.
I
BACKGROUND TO EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING
Evidence-based sentencing focuses on predicting an indi-
vidual's recidivism risk based on empirical research.6 Evi-
dence-based sentencing is a type of risk assessment, or
actuarial method, that relies on a large dataset to evaluate the
"statistical correlations between a group trait and that group's
criminal offending rate" as opposed to a clinical evaluation.7
Empirical research attributes recidivism to a wide range of fac-
tors, including criminal history, sex, age, marital status, em-
ployment, education, parental convictions, family members
who have been crime victims, high school grades, chances of
finding work above minimum wage, dependence on social as-
5 See PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, OVERVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT,
http://pcs.1a.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-re
ports/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/5FUC-GVX2].
6 Starr, supra note 1, at 805.
7 Bernard H. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punish-
ing in an Actuarial Age 11 (U. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 94, 2005); see Jordan M. Hyatt, Mark H. Bergstrom & Steven L.
Chanenson, Follow the Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment into Sentencing, 23
FED. SENT'G REP. 266, 266 (2011) [hereinafter Follow the Evidence] (noting that
actuarial risk assessments rely on static variables whereas clinical risk assess-
ments rely on dynamic variables).
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sistance, finances, and neighborhood of residence.8 By using
an impersonal, data-driven method to determine the recidivism
risk, many actors in the criminal justice system believe that
they are simultaneously increasing fairness in discretionary
sentencing and reducing the overpopulation of prisons by di-
verting low-risk offenders from prison.9
Although probabilistic reasoning is found throughout the
criminal justice system, such as a police officer's determination
that there is sufficient cause for a search, forensic testimony
concerning a DNA "match," or the legal standard for criminal
guilt itself ("beyond a reasonable doubt"), these examples of
probabilistic reasoning are not based on statistical correlations
of a group trait, but rather on a situational case-by-case analy-
sis.10 This new focus on evidence-based sentencing changes
the relationship between group data and individual predictions
in the criminal justice system and results in serious conse-
quences (loss of liberty). An increasing amount of states are
adopting evidence-based sentencing guidelines," and the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Codel 2 draft incorpo-
8 These factors differ between states and assessment methods. Researchers
have identified hundreds of factors relevant to sentencing but are trying to narrow
them down to the few factors that are the most predictive. See Starr, supra note 1,
at 805, 811-13; Sonja B. Starr, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2014), http: / /www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11 /opinion/sentencing-by-the-num-
bers.html [https://perma.c/EML7-TRAY]; see also J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentenc-
ing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 S.M.U.
L. REv. 1329, 1350-51 (2011) (distinguishing "having criminal companions," "an-
tisocial personality," "criminogenic needs," "adult criminal history," and "race" as
strongly significant predictors of recidivism versus "substance abuse," "family
structure," "intellectual functioning," "family criminality," "gender," "socio-eco-
nomic status of origin," and "personal distress" as weaker, but still significant,
predictors). For a list of 125 factors, see PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, INTERIM REPORT 1:
REVIEW OF FACTORS USED IN RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 13-17 (2011).
9 Starr, supra note 8; see Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren
Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org
/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing {https://
perma.cc/8ZPQ-9F92]; Follow the Evidence, supra note 7, at 267 (arguing that
the sentences would be facially disparate, but individualized and thus fair). The
use of evidence-based models is also used in bail determinations. Shaila Dewan,
Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-
science.html [https://perma.cc/5X6J-5KD8].
10 Harcourt, supra note 7, at 11.
11 See NANCY LAVIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE
ASSESSMENT REPORT 39-40 (2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/222 11/412994-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative-State-Assessment-
Report.PDF [https://perma.cc/74XL-3N3K]; see also Starr, supra note 8 (noting
that "this practice has rapidly expanded much more recently").
12 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING app. A at 133, 135 (AM. LAw INST., Discus-
sion Draft No. 4, 2012).
726
EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING
rates a recommendation to use actuarial instruments.13 The
use of predictive instruments to estimate recidivism originated
with discretionary parole (which, ironically, has been abolished
in sixteen states)14 but has expanded to more than twenty
states' current sentencing practices.15 While Pennsylvania is
debuting its own predictive instrument,1 6 other states use ge-
neric actuarial tests that are only sometimes calibrated to
state-specific populations. Two of the most common generic
actuarial tests are the Level of Services Inventory-Revised
(LSI-R) and the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for
Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS).1 7 Like many of the state-spe-
cific tests, these commercial tests include objective and subjec-
tive variables that are unrelated to the defendant's crime.1 8
Both legal and scholarly advocates for evidence-based sen-
tencing believe in its ability to simultaneously hold offenders
accountable, protect the public, and reduce incarceration (and
associated financial costs and social harms).19 Evidence-based
sentencing purportedly offers a "scientific" way to systemati-
cally differentiate low-risk and high-risk offenders. Advocates
argue that judges already engage in predictions during sen-
tencing-therefore, evidence-based sentencing will guide
judges with scientific feedback and increase sentencing trans-
parency. 20 The purported benefits of this transparency extend
's See Starr, supra note 1, at 805.
14 TIMOTHY A. HUGHES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, 1990-2000 (2001). In 1994, Virginia abolished
parole and established a risk assessment instrument for reducing incarceration
rates. David A. Soul6 & Stacy S. Najaka, Paving a Path to Informed Sentencing
Decisions, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 181, 181 (2013).
15 Starr, supra note 1, at 809 ("A review of case law, sentencing commission
websites, and relevant legislation indicates that at least twenty states' courts are
now, in some or all cases, incorporating actuarial risk assessments into the deter-
mination of the defendant's sentence.").
16 Logan Koepke, Pennsylvania Will Vary Jail Terms for the Same Crime,
Based on Where You Live, EQUAL FUTURE (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.equal
future.us/2015/09/16/pennsylvania-will-vary-jail-terms-for-the-same-crime-
based-on-where-you-live/ [https://perma.cc/Z7HU-UQMN].
17 Starr, supra note 1, at 812.
18 Id. at 812-13.
19 See id. at 816; Soul6 & Najaka, supra note 14, at 181; see also Follow the
Evidence, supra note 7, at 266 ("The use of risk assessment at sentencing under-
scores an overall shift in the purposes of sentencing, moving from a backward-
looking retributive approach with a focus on uniformity, proportionality, and
reduction of unwarranted disparity to an approach that also incorporates a for-
malized, forward-looking utilitarian goal.").
20 See Lynn S. Branham, Follow the Leader: The Advisability and Propriety of
Considering Cost and Recidivism Data at Sentencing, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 169, 171
(2012).
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to the general public who will perceive the legal system as more
legitimate, thus causing them to comply with more laws. 2 1
Evidence-based sentencing has also come under scrutiny
and criticism.2 2 Scholars note that because evidence-based
sentencing focuses on uncontrollable characteristics of the de-
fendant rather than the crime at hand, it distorts penological
goals, particularly the retributive and rehabilitative goals.23
Other critics, particularly in the media, analogize evidence-
based sentencing to the movie Minority Report in which the
government punishes crimes before they happen, because a
person's prison sentence is partially based on their future like-
lihood to recidivate. 24 Furthermore, the constitutionality of the
evidence-based sentencing is at question.25 The use of demo-
graphic factors including sex and socioeconomic status raises
constitutional issues such as equal protection and the rights of
indigent defendants. 26 Although these scholars support reduc-
ing incarceration rates, they predict that doing so by consider-
ing demographic factors risks further exacerbating the
inequities of the criminal justice system. 2 7 These critiques are
not limited to academics. Although some courts have appre-
hensively embraced evidence-based sentencing, 28 other actors
21 See Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal
Law and Procedure-And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 866 (2002).
22 See Starr, supra note 1, at 817 ("Although most of the literature on EBS is
positive, or even celebratory, a few scholars have criticized it.").
23 See Harcourt, supra note 7, at 31-32 ("We have come to associate the
prediction of future criminality with just punishment."); see also Starr, supra note
1, at 817 ("[Pirediction instruments contravene punishment theory, because pun-
ishment turns on who the defendant is ... .").
24 Jared Greenhouse, Pennsylvania Wants to Use Science in Criminal Sentenc-
ing, HUFFINGTON PoSr (Aug. 11, 2015, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/science-criminal-sentencing-us_55c8ed49e4b0923cl2bda693 [https://
perma.cc/U272-PUS8]; see Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Ben Casselman & Dana
Goldstein, The New Science of Sentencing, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015,
7:15 AM), [hereinafter The New Science of Sentencing] https://www.themarshali
project.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing#.4mF2KXDVR [https://
perma.cc/9465-4MND].
25 See Starr, supra note 1, at 821-42; Oleson, supra note 8, at 1372-88;
Shaina D. Massie, Note, Orange Is the New Equal Protection Violation: How Evi-
dence-Based Sentencing Harms Male Offenders, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 521,
522 (2015) ("Penological considerations of gender in sentencing are simply incom-
patible with abstract notions that criminal offenders appear before the court in
their individual capacities. More important, the use of gender in evidence-based
sentencing violates the concrete promises of equal protection under the law pro-
vided by the Constitution.").
26 See Starr, supra note 1, at 806.
27 See Id.
28 Danielle Citron, (Un)Fairness of Risk Scores in Criminal Sentencing, FORBES
(July 13, 2016, 3:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2016/07/
13/unfairness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/#46dl61f54479 [https://
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in the justice system, such as former Attorney General Eric
Holder, have warned of the dangers of using immutable char-
acteristics in sentencing decisions. 29
Both sides of the evidence-based sentencing debate have
laudable goals; however, it is difficult, ironically, to predict the
outcome of evidence-based sentencing in the criminal justice
system. Rather than focus on the hypothetical positive and
negative outcomes or the constitutionality of this sentencing
practice, this Note seeks to further contribute to academic dis-
cussion by exploring the scientific validity of such instruments.
II
SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF PREDICTIVE INSTRUMENTS
DURING SENTENCING
Much of the legal and academic discussion surrounding
the validity and use of predictive instruments is focused on two
areas of the law: future dangerousness predictions for capital
perma.cc/H4DJ-FQYBI ("[The Wisconsin Supreme Court] made clear its concerns
about the accuracy and potential bias of risk scoring systems. The Court recog-
nized that while states like New York have studied the effectiveness and predictive
accuracy of COMPAS scores and found them 'satisfactory,' Wisconsin had not
completed a statistical validation study for COMPAS for its population.").
29 Attorney General Holder emphasized that he was "concerned that [risk
assessments] may inadvertently undermine our efforts to ensure individualized
and equal justice. By basing sentencing decisions on static factors and immuta-
ble characteristics-like the defendant's education level, socioeconomic back-
ground, or neighborhood-they may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust
disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in
our society." Eric Holder, Attorney General, Speech at the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice
Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014) (transcript available at https://
www.justice.gov/opa/ speech/ attorney-general-eric-holder- speaks-national-as-
sociation-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/&J5G-FFKU); see
also Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director, Office of Policy and Legisla-
tion, U.S. Department of Justice, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing
Commission, at 7 (July 29, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
criminal/legacy/2014/08/01/2014annual-letter-final-072814.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WMP8-ZGUV ("[Determin[ing] risk levels based on static, historical
offender characteristics such as education level, employment history, family cir-
cumstances and demographic information ... [and] basing criminal sentences,
and particularly imprisonment terms, primarily on such data-rather than the
crime committed and surrounding circumstances-is a dangerous concept that
will become much more concerning over time as other far reaching sociological
and personal information unrelated to the crimes at issue are incorporated into
risk tools. This phenomenon ultimately raises constitutional questions because
of the use of group-based characteristics and suspect classifications in the analyt-
ics. Criminal accountability should be primarily about prior bad acts proven by
the government before a court of law and not some future bad behavior predicted
to occur by a risk assessment instrument.").
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cases3 0 and for sexually violent person civil commitments.31
This section reviews the relevant legal and academic discourse
and analogizes the use of future dangerousness predictions in
these areas to the use of evidence-based predictions at sen-
tencing. Although courts have found the use of future danger-
ousness predictions in capital cases and civil commitments
admissible, many academics argue that a gatekeeping test like
Daubert would disallow this kind of evidence. 32
A. Capital Cases
In the sentencing stages of capital cases, experts may tes-
tify on a capital defendant's future dangerousness.3 3 In Bare-
foot v. Estelle,34 the United States Supreme Court refused to
categorically exclude a psychiatrist's testimony about the de-
fendant's future dangerousness in sentencing, despite the
American Psychiatric Association's assertion that these kinds
of predictions are wrong most of the time.35 In this case, the
Supreme Court echoed the views of some proponents of evi-
dence-based sentencing-notably that some level of prediction
is already present in all aspects of the criminal justice system,
such as bail decisions and parole hearings.3 6 A similar case
arose in United States v. Fields,37 where the appellant did not
argue that "psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness
during the punishment phase are inadmissible per se" but
challenged whether the expert opinion offered was reliably suf-
ficient to be introduced at sentencing.3 8 In the time between
deciding Barefoot and Fields, the United States Supreme Court
had ruled on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,39 in
which it interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 70240 and guided
30 See Brian Sites, Note, The Danger of Future Dangerousness in Death Pen-
alty Use, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 967-69 (2007).
31 See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk
Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1443, 1443-44 (2003).
32 See infra subpart II.A (Capital Cases) and subpart II.B (Sexually Violent
Persons).
33 See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of
Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDozo L. REV.
1845, 1895-1901 (2003).
34 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
35 See id. at 899-904.
36 See id. at 897.
37 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007).
38 Id. at 341.
39 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert supplemented Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
which had superseded Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
40 FED. R. EviD. 702.
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courts acting as "gatekeepers" of expert testimony.4 1 In Fields,
the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Federal Death Penalty Act did
not require a Daubert analysis, despite the American Psycho-
logical Association's urging that some sort of Daubert-like in-
vestigation should be carried out with regard to expert
testimony in sentencing hearings. 4 2
Even in the few states that have called for some gatekeep-
ing test for expert future dangerousness predictions in death
penalty cases, most have refused to categorically exclude fu-
ture dangerousness predictions and many "exempt predictive
expertise from any special testing, applying instead other rules
on expert testimony and standard tests for relevance."4 3 Only
one judge has rejected predictive testimony under Daubert in a
specially concurring opinion." Most scholars agree that
gatekeeping with regards to expert future dangerousness pre-
dictions in death penalty cases is necessary,4 5 but disagree as
to which standard to apply (that is, Daubert or a more relaxed
standard) and whether future dangerousness predictions do, in
41 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-601 (noting that even though "Rule 702
confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the
admissibility of proffered expert testimony[,I" it does not "impose[ I on them either
the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform
that role").
42 Fields, 438 F.3d at 342.
43 Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert Predictions in Civil
Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 61-62, 73-75 (2003) (footnote omitted); see
Sites, supra note 30, at 970-71 (noting that when courts are "faced with choosing
between abandoning a desirable sentencing tool (future dangerousness) and rely-
ing on unsteady analytical tools (psychological testing), courts prefer the latter").
44 See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458-70 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J.,
specially concurring) (subjecting the predictive testimony to a Daubert analysis
and arguing that Barefoot should be overturned). But see People v. Murtishaw,
631 P.2d 446, 470 (Cal. 1981) (rejecting predictive dangerousness testimony not
under Kelly/Frye but rather because the court found that the testimony's prejudi-
cial impact outweighed its probative value). The court in Murtishaw noted that in
places where the jury is required by law to determine whether someone is "dan-
gerous," such predictive testimony, although unreliable, would often be the only
evidence available to assist the trier of fact. Id. at 469; see 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)
(2012) ("Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules
governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.").
45 See generally Sites, supra note 30, at 987, 992-95 (arguing that Daubert
should apply to death penalty sentencing proceedings and supplementary meth-
ods to minimize jury confusion); Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Pre-
diction: Future Dangerousness Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 353, 364-79 (2003) (arguing that Barefoot was wrongly decided and
proposing the constitutionalization of the Daubert test for death penalty sentenc-
ing proceedings).
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fact, satisfy Daubert.46 Despite the fact that Daubert does not
apply to state or federal4 7 sentencing procedures, academic
and legal discussions have made it clear that Daubert offers a
helpful framework through which to analyze the reliability of
future dangerousness predictions in capital penalty
sentencing.4 8
B. Sexually Violent Persons
Predictive assessments of future dangerousness have also
been used in civil commitment hearings of sexually violent per-
sons. Civil commitments are used to continue to incapacitate
sex offenders who have finished their criminal sentences. 49
Risk assessment plays a central role in this assessment5 0 and
is often mandated by state law. 51
Despite the known flaws of such predictive data tech-
niques, courts have continued to allow this kind of evidence. 52
The legal and scholarly debate surrounding civil commitments
highlights the lack of consensus over what standard of eviden-
tiary admissibility should be used for expert testimony in civil
commitment.5 3 As in capital cases, some scholars have used
Daubert as a framework to analyze the admissibility of future
dangerousness predictions in sexual violent person civil com-
mitment hearings.54
46 See generally Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 33, at 1847,
1856-57, 1880, 1900 (applying Daubert as a constitutional ground to decide
whether expert testimony on a specific defendant's future dangerousness violates
due process and concluding that clinical predictions must be excluded and that
actuarial instruments "barely squeak through" Daubert).
47 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3, Com-
mentary (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016) ("In determining the relevant facts, sen-
tencing judges are not restricted to information that would be admissible at
trial.").
48 See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 33, at 1859.
49 See Janus & Prentky, supra note 31, at 1443.
50 See id. at 1443-44.
51 See George G. Woodworth & Joseph B. Kadane, Expert Testimony Support-
ing Post-Sentence Civil Incarceration of Violent Sexual Offenders, 3 LAW,
PROBABILIY AND RISK 221, 236 (2004). For example, "Virginia's Sexually Violent
Predator statute not only mandates the use of a specific instrument but also
specifies the cutoff score on that instrument that must be achieved to proceed
further in the commitment process." Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Cur-
rent Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20 CuRRENT DIRECTONS IN PSYCHOL.
Sci. 38, 38 (2011).
52 Janus & Prentky, supra note 31, at 1444.
53 See Woodworth & Kadane, supra note 51, at 236.
54 See id. (suggesting how risk assessments for violent sexual offenders may
be changed to pass Daubert challenges); see also Janus & Prentky, supra note 31,
at 1446 (arguing that actuarial risk assessments in civil commitments are admis-
sible under Daubert).
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C. Analogy to Evidence-Based Sentencing
The legal and academic discourse regarding future danger-
ousness predictions in capital cases and civil commitments
highlights two competing goals-allowing the introduction of
appropriate scientific evidence and giving the fact-finder as
much information as possible to render an appropriate deci-
sion.5 5 This tension also exists in evidence-based sentencing.
Despite the fact that sentencing hearings do not subject
scientific evidence to the same rigorous testing as during
trial,5 6 this Note will follow the academic discussion surround-
ing future dangerousness predictions in capital cases and civil
commitments and argue that evidence-based sentencing
should pass Daubert.5 7
III
DAUBERrS APPLICATION TO EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING
GENERALLY AND IN PENNSYLVANIA
"Daubert unequivocally endorses 'empirically validated
treatments' and 'evidence-based practices'" and protects the
jury from giving undue weight to an unreliable and invalid
expert testimony.5 8 A Daubert analysis requires trial judges to
decide "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
55 See Woodworth & Kadane, supra note 51, at 236 (proposing "that the
statistical expert's job is to provide the fact-finder with the means to determine, as
accurately and specifically as possible, the probability that this offender will
recidivate given what is known"); see also Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra
note 33, at 1901 (noting that "[blecause juries are likely to evaluate the future
dangerousness of any criminal defendant ... they should be provided with the
most accurate information that can bear on such an assessment. This includes
actuarial risk factor studies . . . .").
56 One legal commentator characterizes the lack of safeguards around expert
testimony at sentencing hearings as "an evidentiary free-for-all." Beecher-Monas,
supra note 45, at 357. Nineteen states have ruled that either the states' eviden-
tiary admissibility standards do not apply to expert testimony based on struc-
tured risk assessments or, if they do apply, these structured risk assessments.
meet the unchallenging standard. Daniel A. Krauss & Nicholas Scurich, Risk
Assessment in the Law: Legal Admissibility, Scientific Validity, and Some Dispari-
ties Between Research and Practice, 31 BEHAV. SCI. L. 215, 220 (2013).
57 But see generally Pari McGarraugh, Note, Up or Out: Why "Sufficiently
Reliable" Statistical Risk Assessment Is Appropriate at Sentencing and Inappropri-
ate at Parole, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1079, 1083, 1112 (2013) (arguing for "sufficiently
reliable" as an admissibility standard of actuarial risk assessments because of the
other due process safeguards that are available to defendants at sentencing).
58 David L. Faigman & lohn Monahan, Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of
the Law's Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 631, 656 (2005); see Krauss &
Scurich, supra note 56, at 219.
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testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."59
Thus, testimony or evidence6 0 must be reliable and rele-
vant to help the trier of fact resolve the factual issue.6 1 Le-
gally,62 reliability of the scientific technique turns on its
scientific validity.6 3 The relevance requirement under Daubert
asks whether the information is helpful in deciding the case at
hand.6 4 This allows the trial court to analyze "whether this
particular expert ha[s] sufficient specialized knowledge to as-
sist the jurors 'in deciding the particular issues in the case."'6 5
Despite acknowledging that there is no "definitive checklist
or test,"66 the United States Supreme Court laid out four fac-
tors typically relevant to determining reliability of scientific evi-
dence: 1) "whether a theory or technique . . . can be (and has
been) tested"; 2) "whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication"; 7 3) what the known
error rate (or potential rate of error) is and whether standards
that control the technique's operation exist; and 4) whether the
technique is generally accepted within a relevant scientific
community and to what degree.6 8 This analysis is a "flexible"
inquiry focusing on "principles and methodology."6 9
59 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
60 The Daubert test also includes expert testimony involving technical and
other specialized knowledge. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
141 (1999) (holding "that Daubert's general holding-setting forth the trial judge's
general 'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to testimony based on 'scien-
tific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized'
knowledge").
61 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (stating that "under the Rules the trial judge
must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable"); Janus & Prentky, supra note 31, at 1460-61.
62 The author would like to draw attention to the fact that in the sciences,
validity and reliability are two separate concepts. In such context, validity mea-
sures whether the answer given by a tool or test is correct. Reliability measures
whether the answer given (regardless of correctness) is consistent. For a discus-
sion of these differences, see DAVID B. ORR, FUNDAMENTALS OF APPLIED STATISTICS AND
SURVEYs 54-55 (1995).
63 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, n.9; Scherr, supra note 43, at 9.
64 See Scherr, supra note 43, at 9. For the sake of brevity, this Note will
assume that the evidence-based sentencing is relevant, but readers are en-
couraged to consider Melissa Hamilton's article, Adventures in Risk, infra note 78,
specifically her discussion on "Fit," as well as infra Part V (Public Policy
Concerns).
65 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 156.
66 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
67 Id. "[Slubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a compo-
nent of 'good science,' in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive
flaws in methodology will be detected." Id.
68 Id. at 594.
69 Id. at 594-95.
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The following sections analyze evidence-based sentencing
under each of the four Daubert factors for reliability. Each
section draws on the literature surrounding actuarial assess-
ments in general, followed by a closer analysis of the Penn-
sylvania Commission on Sentencing's proposed tool.
Although more than twenty states have embraced some
use of evidence-based sentencing, they do so in very different
ways. 70 In some jurisdictions, state legislatures have passed
laws requiring actuarial risk assessments in sentencing proce-
dures,7 1 while in other jurisdictions, the judicial branch has
endorsed risk assessments not required by the legislature. 7 2
To make matters more complicated, in still other jurisdictions,
the judiciary and legislative branches have worked in tandem
to create an evidence-based sentencing system.7 3 After decid-
ing to use evidence-based sentencing, states can either use
commercial risk assessments, such as LSI-R and COMPAS, or
create their own.74 Therefore, the discussion below regarding
evidence-based sentencing in general will be broad because a
survey reviewing such diverse practices is outside of the scope
of this Note.75
Finally, this Note argues that even if evidence-based sen-
tencing were to pass a Daubert analysis, a mechanism such as
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 would disallow the testimony.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 gives the Court "'very broad' dis-
cretion"76 to exclude the expert evidence if the probative value
70 See Center for Sentencing Initiatives, State Policies & Legislation: Interac-
tive Map, NCSC (July 2016), http://www.ncsc.org/microsites/csi/home/In-the-
States/State-Activities/RNA-Map.aspx [https://perma.cc/3V7F-6XEK]; Luis
Daniel, The Dangers ofEvidence-Based Sentencing, GovLAB (Oct. 31, 2014), http:/
/thegovlab.org/the-dangers-of-evidence-based-sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/
5X3G-AT6T].
71 Some such laws include TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1-412 (2017); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5120.114 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 22-988.18 (West 2017);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:327 (2014); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-102 (2017); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.007 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1(3) (West 2017).
72 Some examples of these jurisdictions are Arkansas, Indiana, and Arizona.
See Center for Sentencing Initiatives, supra note 70.
73 Id.
74 For example, Wyoming uses LSI-R, Michigan uses COMPAS, and Ohio has
its own risk assessment system (ORAS). Id.
75 Though a comparison of different categories of current practices would
significantly add to current literature, much of this information is inaccessible to
the public.
76 United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 322 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Hawkins, 969 F.2d 169, 174 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice77 or
of confusing the Jury.7 8
A. Introduction to the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing Risk Assessment Tool
The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing started de-
veloping a risk assessment tool in 2010.79 The Commission
developed and validated a risk assessment tool for all Level 3
and Level 4 offenses.8 0 In 2015, the Commission published a
report on the development of a new risk assessment scale for
all five offense levels in Pennsylvania. 8 ' The results of this risk
assessment tool (based on nine categories of Offense Gravity
Scores for the risk of re-offense for any crime) was developed
and validated twice using samples of offenders sentenced
1998-2000 and 2004-2006 and published in February 2016.82
The Commission used the risk assessment tool created from
1998-2000 development sample, but not yet validated, to ana-
lyze the effects of removing sex, age, and county from the
model.8 3 Finally, in February 2016, the Pennsylvania Commis-
sion on Sentencing indicated its interest in creating a risk as-
sessment tool to assess the risk of re-offense for a crime against
a person.84 Although the proposed law implementing the risk
assessment instruments indicates that this tool has been cre-
ated and will be used along with the risk assessment tool as-
sessing the risk of re-offense for any crime,85 the Commission
77 "Unfair prejudice 'does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that
results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to
evidence which tends to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis.'" United
States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986)).
78 See Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual
Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 56-57 (2015) [hereinafter Ad-
ventures in Risk].
79 See PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT INTERIM REPORT
1: REVIEW OF FACTORS USED IN RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 2 (2011).
80 See PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, RISK ASSESSMENT PROJECT II INTERIM REPORT 2:
VALIDATION OF A RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT BY OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE FOR ALL
OFFENDERS 2 (2016). [hereinafter VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE].
81 See PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT II INTERIM RE-
PORT 1: DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE BY OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE FOR ALL
OFFENDERS 1 (2015).
82 See id. at 1-4.
83 See PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, RISK ASSESSMENT PROJECT II SPECIAL REPORT: THE
IMPACT OF REMOVING AGE, GENDER, AND COUNTY FROM THE RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE 2
(2015) [hereinafter IMPACT OF REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS].
84 See VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE, supra note 80, at 28.
85 See PA. COMM'N ON SENTG, PROPOSALS PUBLISHED IN PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN (47
PA.B. 1999) § 305.2 (2017) [hereinafter PROPOSALS PUBLISHED], http://
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has yet to release any of the data on the development or valida-
tion of such sample in its available reports.8 6
B. Prong 1: Whether Evidence-Based Sentencing Has
Been Tested?
The first prong of the Daubert analysis requires determin-
ing whether evidence-based sentencing can be and has been
tested.8 7 This Note will first review the testing of common simi-
lar risk-assessment tools (though they are not necessarily only
used for sentencing)88 to show the difficulty with determining
what is being tested and whether it can be tested. This Note
will then turn to address the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing's risk assessment model.
Before deciding whether evidence-based sentencing can be
and has been tested, it is necessary to ask what is being tested.
This could include one of two questions: whether the statistical
technique used to calculate a risk score has been tested, and
whether the outcomes of such a statistical technique have been
tested.8 9
As detailed in Part I, evidence-based sentencing relies on
determining the predictive factors for a certain developmental
pcs.1a.psu.edu/guidelines/proposed-for-public-comment-sentence-risk-assess
ment-instrument/annex-b/view [https://perma.cc/P5N9-5UV4].
86 The reports featured at the time this analysis was done are: Phase I Interim
Report 1: Review of Factors Used in Risk Assessment Instruments; Phase I In-
terim Report 2: Recidivism Study: Initial Recidivism Information; Phase I Interim
Report 3: Factors that Predict Recidivism for Various Types of Offenders; Phase I
Interim Report 4: Development of Risk Assessment Scale; Phase I Interim Report
5: Developing Categories of Risk; Phase I Interim Report 6: Impact of Risk Assess-
ment Tool for Low Risk Offenders; Phase I Interim Report 7: Validation of Risk
Scale; Phase I Interim Report 8: Communicating Risk at Sentencing; Phase I
Special Report: The Impact of Juvenile Record on Recidivism Risk; Phase II In-
terim Report 1: Development of a Risk Assessment Scale by Offense Gravity Score
for All Offenders; Phase II Interim Report 2: Validation of Risk Assessment Instru-
ment by OGS for All Offenses; Phase II Special Report: Impact of Removing Demo-
graphic Factors; Sentence Risk Assessment Instrument Adopted for Purpose of
Public Comment. See PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, Overview of the Sentence Risk As-
sessment Instrument, http://pcs.1a.psu.edu/publications-and-research/re
search-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/TY6S-36C8]
(follow "Phase I," "Phase II," and "Sentence Risk Assessment Instrument for pur-
poses of public comment" hyperlinks). Subsequent reports and drafts are still
being added.
87 See Daubert v. Merrell Down Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
88 Many tests are wrongly used for sentencing despite specific warnings not to
use them. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 1, at 812 (citing DEP'T OF CORRECTIVE SERVS.,
LSI-R TRAINING MANUAL 8 (2002); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFIL-
ING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 78-84 (2007); Starr, supra note 1,
at 809 n.11).
89 See HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTs 375-77 (David Carson &
Ray Bull eds., 2d ed. 2003).
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or normed sample, attributing appropriate weights for each
predictive factor, and creating an estimated probability of the
outcome (here, recidivism) occurring for each score or group of
scores.90 This is often achieved through a logistic regression, a
commonly accepted statistical technique.9 ' The Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing used a logistic regression to create
its actuarial instrument.92
Although using logistic regression to create predictive in-
struments is a commonly accepted and tested technique, a
closer look at the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing's
predictive instrument shows that not all logistic regressions are
created equally. First, the predictive ability of a test is limited
to the development sample. 93 For example, the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing randomly divided its samples of the
offenders convicted between 1998 to 2000 and 2004 to 2006 at
all five offense levels into two groups: one development and one
validation. 94 The fact that the models derived from half of these
two development groups were validated using the other half of
the development groups in the same time frame does little to
show its predictive value in the future, which is the purpose of
this study. After creating and validating the model by two sam-
ples in the same time frame, the Commission should have gone
one step further to test the predictive ability of the model on a
sample that had not been used to develop the model, such as
2008 to 2010.
For the proposed law implementing these risk assessment
tools, recidivism is measured by re-arrests within three years,
which does not include out-of-state, federal or foreign charges,
or a re-arrest dismissed by a minor court.9 5 Although the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission included technical viola-
90 See Adventures in Risk, supra note 78, at 9. Within the group of score
known as "risk bins" (high, medium, low), there is no commonly agreed upon
definitions of risk categories, accepted metrics, or normative legal distinctions for
such labels. Among different tests, the same person can have a vastly different
risk category. See, e.g., id. at 21 (describing a study in which sex offenders
received disparate categorical labels based on scores from different risk assess-
ment instruments).
91 Personal communication with Professor John Zipp, University of Akron
(Jan. 2, 2017). See GARETH JAMES ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL LEARNING:
WITH APPLICATIONS IN R 127 (2013, corrected at 8th printing 2017).
92 See PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, INTERIM REPORT 3: FACTORS THAT PREDICT RECIDI-
VISM FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF OFFENDERS (PHASE I) 6 (2011) [hereinafter FACTORS THAT
PREDICT RECIDIVISM].
93 See HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS, supra note 89, at 381.
94 See VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE, supra note 80, at 9.
95 PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, § 305.1(b)(15).
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tions as re-arrests in its development sample,9 6 the final pro-
posed law explicitly excludes the use of the Sentence Risk
Assessment Instrument for the sentences imposed as a result
of "revocation of probation, intermediate punishment or pa-
role."9 7 Depending on the quantity and shared characteristics
of those re-arrested on a technical violation, the current risk
assessment tool is likely to fit less well due to this statutory
exclusion that was not accounted for in the creation of the
model.
Additionally, arrest itself may be a false proxy for criminal-
ity resulting from higher level of policing in certain neighbor-
hoods.98 The high incidence of plea bargaining in the U.S.
criminal justice system, which may include a significant
amount of innocent people who plead guilty even though they
could have had their case dismissed by a minor court, com-
pounds concerns that arrest is an inappropriate measurement
of recidivism.9 9
In the end, the results from an actuarial risk assessment
(usually a number on a scale) do little to determine the qualita-
tive features of the defendant's punishment (ail, probation, or
fine; length of time; and possibility of parole). The Commission
attempts to contextualize the recidivism risk by using two sep-
arate evidence-based sentencing tools for "Risk of Re-Offense
for Any Offense" and the "Risk of Re-Offense for an Offense
96 See VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE, supra note 80, at 4.
97 PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, § 305.3(b).
98 When "there are more police officers making more arrests in high-crime
neighborhoods." those living in that area "will automatically score higher simply
because of where they live." Therefore, when police are predisposed to arrest
minorities without good cause, a prediction based on arrests can falsely interpret
arbitrary arrests as a sign of increased criminality among minority groups, which
creates a positive feedback loop that reinforces the pattern. See Ryan Briggs,
Should Your Race or ZIP Code Determine Jail Time?, CITY & STATE PA. (Aug. 2, 2016,
11:39 AM), http://www.cityandstatepa.com/content/brewing-battle-over-what-
factors-will-determine-jail-time [https://perma.ce/AMW7-LTZC. See also Testi-
mony of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Public Defender Association of Pennsylvania and the
Allegheny County Public Defender's Office Before the Sentencing Commission of
Pennsylvania (May 25, 2017), at 3-4, http://pcs.1a.psu.edu/guidelines/sentenc-
lng/sentencing-guidelines-and-implementation-manuals/7th-edition-amend-
ment-4-1-1-2018-1/7th-edition-amendment-4-adopted-for-purposes-of-public-
comment/testimony/testimony-mark-houldin-and-bradley-s.-bridge-defender-
association-of-philadelphia-philadelphia-may-25-2017/view [https://perma.cc/
G7EW-72RB] (describing the racial disparity in policing measures in
Pennsylvania).
99 See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-
people-plead-guilty/?insrc=whc [https://perma.cc/S6KS-GGKB].
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Against a Person"; 0 0 however, the contours and relative grav-
ity of these crimes are hazy. A robbery of a motor vehicle is
considered an "Offense Against a Person,"' 0 but operating a
meth lab is not.1 0 2 Similarly, gravity between and among these
types of crimes is not intuitive; for example, both fortunetelling
for money and operating a meth lab are considered "Any Of-
fense."' 0 3 Thus, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentenc-
ing's predictions tell us the probability a person will be re-
arrested within the next three years for a wide range of crimes
based on a tool that has not been validated on a future sample
but instead only on a sample in the same time frame as the
model's development sample.
Although choosing the right sample upon which to create a
predictive model through logistic regression is crucial, the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing's methods also
demonstrate how the selection of the model's variables is im-
portant. When selecting the factors to include in its model,
Pennsylvania's risk assessment tool only took the factors found
to be significant predictors of recidivism.1 04 Although race and
county were statistically significant factors,105 the final Penn-
sylvania Commission on Sentencing risk assessment tool does
not include race and county as factors. 0 6 The Commission
explains that race and county are "statistically controlled for in
the analyses, which means that the effects of the other factors
are included only after eliminating the effects of race and
county." 0 7 The Commission never explains why it keeps race
and county in the model to create the risk assessment tool even
when it knows that it is going to exclude it from the risk scale.
Thus, it is preferable that the logistic regression model be re-
run without race and county rather than controlling for it post
hoc. By including both race and county in the model, the Com-
mission could be ignoring other factors that could have been
100 See PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, § 305.2(b)(2).
101 See PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, § 305.1(b)(9) (citing 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9714(g) (2015)).
102 Given that the definition of § 305. 1(b)(9) in PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra
note 85, is exclusive, operating a meth lab would not be considered an "Offense
Against a Person" as it does not fall within any of the three categories of crimes
defining an "Offense Against a Person." See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7508.2 (2015)
(operating a meth lab).
03 Because neither is included in the definition of "Offense Against a Person,"
they both fall into the residual category of "Any Offense." See 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7104 (2015) (fortunetelling).
104 See VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAvrY SCORE, supra note 80, at 12.
105 See id. at 51-58 ("Final Logistic Models by Offense Gravity Score").
106 See PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, § 305. 1(b)(18).
107 VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE, supra note 80, at 12 n.8.
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significant in the development model had race and county not
been initially included. 0 8
The outcomes of such predictive instruments have been
typically measured using area under the curve (AUC) analysis
to measure the discrimination of the test; that is, how well the
predictive test can differentiate those who experienced the out-
come of interest (labeled as likely to recidivate and did recidi-
vate) versus those who did not (labeled as likely to recidivate
but did not recidivate).' 0 9 Melissa Hamilton notes that many
researchers misconstrue the meaning of the area under the
curve when evaluating risk assessment tools. The AUC analy-
sis provides "'the probability that a randomly selected individ-
ual who committed an [act of recidivism] . . . received a higher
risk classification than a randomly selected individual who did
not' reoffend.""1 0 This does not tell us "information on the
accuracy of any individual prediction,""' "the probability that
individuals are scored correctly . . [, or] the potential that a
person assessed with a high test score will eventually become a
recidivist."1 1 2
Typically, AUC values in popular risk assessments for vio-
lent and sexual recidivism tools range from 70-75%, meaning
that "these risk instruments have been able to classify violent
and sexual recidivists at higher levels of risk than non-recidi-
vists about 70 to 75% of the time."" 3 Although these values
108 Personal Communication with Professor John Zipp (Jan. 2, 2017). See
also generally Adventures in Risk, supra note 78, at 20-21 (discussing how "risk
tools typically include a relatively small number of variables, thereby omitting a
plethora of potential explanatory or correlative factors").
109 See Adventures in Risk, supra note 78, at 25.
110 Id. at 25 (alteration in the original) (quoting Jay P. Singh et al., Measure-
ment of Predictive Validity in Violence Risk Assessment Studies: A Second-Order
Systematic Review, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 55, 64 (2013)). "An AUC of .90, as an
illustration, means that if one randomly chooses a recidivist and a non-recidivist,
the recidivist's actuarial score would be higher than the non-recidivist's score
about 90% of the time." Id. (citing Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Federal
Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA): A Construction and Validation Study, 10
PSYCHOL. SERVS. 87, 92 n. 11 (2013)). More problematic is that "a scale can achieve
a high rating for discrimination even when the average predicted risk of violent re-
offense is significantly different than the actual percentage of violent recidivists."
Id. at 24 (citing Nancy R. Cook, Use and Misuse of the Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic Curve in Risk Prediction, 115 CIRCULATION 928, 928 (2007)).
111 Id. at 27 (citing Thomas Nilsson et al., The Precarious Practice of Forensic
Psychiatric Risk Assessments, 32 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 400, 402 (2009)).
112 Id. at 26 (citing Cook, supra note 110, at 928).
113 Id. Some experts contend that this common rate is due to similar factors
being used by recidivism risk tools and that technologies have possibly reached
the natural limit for predicting human behavior. Id. at 28 (citing John Monahan &
Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assessment in Criminal
Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 158, 158 (2014)).
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perform statistically better than chance (50%), many research-
ers equate these values to moderate or large effect sizes." 4
However, in statistics, there is no consensus as to which AUC
scores represent small, moderate, or large effect sizes.115 With-
out such a consensus, researchers could tout that a certain
predictive instrument effect size is large enough to be used in
the courts without having to define what "large" is across the
literature or describe the specific definition of a tool's AUC.1 16
Finally, the Commission confines the use of this tool in a
way that may not fully achieve the benefits of evidence-based
sentencing, particularly reducing incarceration rates. For of-
fenders falling into the typical risk category (the middle 68%),
the Commission makes no additional recommendation; there-
fore these defendants are sentenced on the information availa-
ble.117 For low- or high-risk offenders, the Commission
recommends a separate pre-sentencing report to collect more
information before sentencing." 8 Whether more closely ana-
lyzing the remaining 32% of low- or high-risk offenders' situa-
tions will actually result in different, more effective
incarceration is an open question. Although using logistic re-
gressions to predict individual outcomes as a general technique
can be and has been tested, the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing fails to justify why its sample, validation method,
and variables differ from what one would expect in a similar
scenario.
C. Prong 2: Whether Evidence-Based Sentencing Has
Been Subjected to Peer Review and Publication?
Judges typically pay close attention to publication and
peer review, even more so than the testing or error rates.11
Judges may focus on journal names as a proxy for quality
scholarship, but it is important to assess the content of the
published studies.1 2 0 The importance of peer review is to de-
114 Id. at 26 (citing R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assess-
ments for Sex Offenders: A Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 LAW & Hum.
BEHAV. 119, 129 (2000)).
115 Id.
116 Hamilton suggests that focusing on calibration is a better benchmark for
evaluating an instrument's predictive ability. Id. at 28-29.
117 See PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, §§ 305.1(b)(17), 305.5(b).
118 See PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, § 305.5(c).
119 Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84
GEO. L.J. 1985, 2029 (1996).
120 Id. at 2029; Adventures in Risk, supra note 78, at 57-61. See generally
MICHAEL J. SAKS ET AL., ANNOTATED REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
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tect the design flaws of studies; any conclusion is only as good
as the methods used to attain it.121
Generally, evidence-based sentencing has received policy-
based and learning-oriented discussions. 1 2 2 Peer reviews spe-
cific to the technique and efficacy of actuarial risk assess-
ments, in general, are commonly limited to predictions of
violence, 123 not recidivism. With its growing use, however,
there is an increasing presence of academic literature sur-
rounding risk assessment in sentencing.1 2 4
Several factors impede the ability of the scientific commu-
nity to peer review methods specific to validity. First, the pro-
prietary nature of commercial tests creates conditions in which
the company producing the test is validating its own studies or
is involved in another researcher's validation.1 25 This self-re-
view does not count as peer review, and those reviewing it on
behalf of the company should disclose this potential conflict of
interest. Additionally, limited data from states where evidence-
based sentencing has been used for a long time, such as Vir-
ginia, make it difficult to evaluate both the methods and
efficacy.1 2 6
Not only does the proprietary nature of commercial tools
impede the ability of scientists to conduct peer review on the
107-08 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing several scenarios where a position's illusion of
prestige masks flaws in their methods).
121 See Kesan, supra note 119, at 2029-30.
122 See, e.g., PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER
RISK & NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 2 (2014), [hereinafter
OFFENDER RISK & NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS] http://www.nesc.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/CSI /BJA%2ORNA%2oFinal%2oReportCombined%2oFiles
%208-22-14.ashx [https://perma.cc/MXU7-X5NZ ("This Primer is a resource to
help judges and others involved in sentencing understand and make knowledgea-
ble decisions about the value and use of a [risk and needs] assessment.").
123 See Jay P. Singh et al., Measurement of Predictive Validity in Violence Risk
Assessment Studies: A Second-Order Systematic Review, 31 BEHAV. SCI. L. 55, 55
(2013) ("Tihese (risk assessment] instruments are designed to aid in the assess-
ment of risk for antisocial behavior, most commonly general violence, sexual
violence, and criminal offending."); Min Yang et al., The Efficacy of Violence Predic-
tion: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Nine Risk Assessment Tools, 136 PSYCHOL. L.
BULL. 740, 741 (2010) ("In most cases, actuarial tools are designed by combining
empirically or theoretically derived constructs that are predictive of violence or
antisocial activities to guide the forecasting of future antisocial or violent acts.").
124 Skimming through the following sources helps give an idea of the amount
of publications. Letter from Brian D. Johnson, Professor at Univ. of Md., James P.
Lynch, Professor at Univ. of Md., & Rebecca Richardson, Doctoral Student, to
Conn. Sentencing Comm'n (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.ct.gov/ctsc/lib/ctsc/
2016-O1DRAFT.pdf [https://perma.cc/52RG-TP8P]; OFFENDER RISK & NEEDS AS-
SESSMENT INSTRUMENTS, supra note 122, at 32.
125 See Starr, supra note 8 (noting that risk prediction instruments are fre-
quently not very transparent).
126 The New Science of Sentencing, supra note 24.
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tool, it also interferes with due process considerations. In
March 2017, the United States Supreme Court indicated that it
was interested in whether a defendant's right to due process
was violated by a judge's consideration of a COMPAS report
that the defendant was unable to inspect or challenge by re-
questing that the federal government file an amicus brief argu-
ing whether it should hear the case.1 2 7
Although there is a growing body of peer review literature
for evidence-based sentencing, Hamilton's critique of incorrect
statistical interpretation warns of the danger of reading too
quickly.12 8 Under Daubert, courts should consider which test
is being presented when looking for specific peer review, as not
all research on risk assessment will be applicable. Although
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing has said that it
will seek an external validation once the development process
is completed, if it has occurred, it is not yet available, and the
risk assessment program is set to begin on July 1, 2018 with-
out any restrictions subjecting the risk assessment tools to
external peer review. 129
D. Prong 3: What Is the Known (or Potential) Error Rate
and Are There Standards that Control Evidence-
Based Sentencing?
The error rates of evidence-based sentencing are crucial to
the Daubert analysis and directly hinge on how much error a
society is willing to tolerate in exchange for the purported
safety benefits of correctly identifying a defendant with a high-
risk of recidivism.o3 0 Evidence-based sentencing, by churning
127 Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Sofhare Program's Secret Algorithms,
N,Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/
sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secret-algorithms.html [perma.cc/VR2Z-
J422].
128 Adventures in Risk, supra note 78, at 2-3.
129 The fact that Pennsylvania is seeking an external peer review is available
through a source created by the former Chair of the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing. No other information on the status of this external validation was
posted on the Commission on Sentencing's risk assessment website. Steven L.
Chanenson & Jordan M. Hyatt, The Use of Risk Assessment at Sentencing: Impli-
cations for Research and Policy 9 (Villanova U. Charles Widger Sch. of L. Working
Paper Series, 2016) http://digitalcomnmons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article= 1201&context=wps [https://perma.cc/G855-3ZDP].
130 Some try to draw false negative parallels with a comparison between
medicine and law, but law has different standards and goals than medicine. See
Adventures in Risk, supra note 78, at 55. But see, Aaron E. Carroll, What We
Mean When We Say Evidence-Based Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), https: /
/www.nytimes.com/2017/12/27/upshot/what-we-mean-when-we-say-evidence
-based-medicine.html [https://perma.cc/988D-KHK6] (explaining how even "evi-
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out a single number on a scale interpreted as an indication of a
defendant's future recidivism rate, has the potential to mask
the risk of error with the allure of the scientific method. 13 1
Each risk assessment tool had its own calculable error
rate, which means that each tool should be individually subject
to Daubert. However, to provide some context to the general
efficacy of risk assessments, a meta-analysis found that nine
different violence risk assessment tools had comparable, mod-
erate levels of predictive efficacy and recommended that they
not be used as the primary means for a criminal justice
decision. 132
Another problem that aggravates errors is the failure to
conduct local validations of commercial methods in approxi-
mately 70 percent of the jurisdictions that use assessment in-
struments, which can result in inaccurate classifications. 133
Local validations are important because of the difference be-
tween jurisdictions as to their "laws, policies, or sentencing
guidelines (e.g., management of felony offenses, eligibility for
probation, risk of recidivism defined locally as re-arrest vs. re-
conviction) may create a unique set of circumstances and con-
straints that can reduce the effectiveness of a tool created
elsewhere."' 3 4
For Pennsylvania, the error rate depending upon the distri-
bution of the risk categories led to an overall prediction accu-
racy ranging from 49 to 65 percent for the tools developed for
the Level 3 and Level 4 samples.135
The lower the cutoff point for determining high risk, the bet-
ter the prediction accuracy for high risk .. .but the worse the
prediction accuracy for low risk .... Alternatively, the higher
the cutoff point for determining high risk, the worse the pre-
diction accuracy for high risk, but the better the prediction
accuracy for low risk.13 6
dence-based medicine" is facing similar definitional, practical, and policy
concerns).
131 See id. at 56-57.
132 See Yang et al., supra note 123, at 761.
133 PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK
AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM A
NATIONAL WORKING GROUP 29-31 (2011), http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Micro
sites/Fles/CSI/RNA%2OGuide%2OFinal.ashx [perma.cc/XU2U-TXEB].
134 Id. at 30 (emphasis omitted).
135 PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT INTERIM REPORT 7:
VALIDATION OF RISK SCALE 2, 4 (2013).
136 Id. at 4.
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The Commission does not provide a similarly user-friendly
analysis for its current risk assessment tool that includes all of
the levels of offense. 137
E. Prong 4: Whether Evidence-Based Sentencing Is
Generally Accepted Within a Relevant Scientific
Community and to What Degree?
The purpose of the general acceptance prong of Daubert is
to uncover whether there is general agreement that the scien-
tific theory is "not based on a novel theory or procedure that is
'mere speculation or conjecture."'138  A theory that does not
have the acceptance of most of the pertinent scientific commu-
nity or is disfavored by a substantial part of the scientific com-
munity will not be generally accepted.1 3 9 Although absolute
certainty is not necessary for a finding of general accept-
ance, o4 0 it is crucial to first determine the scope of the relevant
scientific community in order to establish whether evidence-
based sentencing is generally accepted. 141 The criteria used to
decide who is part of the relevant scientific community must be
broad enough to reach a spectrum of scientists who are not
entirely financially, professionally, and ideologically invested in
the field.1 4 2 However, in the search to find a broad enough
scientific community, the factfinder must still limit the commu-
nity to those who truly understand the research basis for the
work. '4 Though judges, parole officers, pre-sentence investi-
gators, corrections officers, and other actors in the criminal
justice system are exposed to and use a variety of actuarial risk
137 VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAVITy SCORE, supra note 80, at 22.
138 United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 562 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 559 (6th Cir. 1977)).
139 Id. at 562 (citing Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718, 725 (6th Cir.
1989)).
140 Id.
141 David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific
Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 460, 463 (2014) [hereinafter G2i] ("The
key difficulty [ I involves identifying what field should be selected for review. Very
often fields are defined by self-interested practitioners or established guilds. For
example, if a court asks experts in the areas of polygraphs, bite marks, bullet
lead, or hair identification about general acceptance, it would likely hear a chorus
of consensus, though each of these areas of claimed expertise has been thor-
oughly discredited.").
142 Id. at 461 ("Professional overinvestment might include a researcher who is
a leading figure in the field but whose life's work depends on acceptance of the
expertise. Ideological investment might include a researcher whose judgment
about the validity of an empirical framework will be influenced by its ability to
further a desired policy outcome.").
143 Id. at 461-62.
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assessments in making decisions, they are not the relevant
scientific community.14 4
For evidence-based sentencing, the relevant scientific com-
munity could extend to statisticians and social scientists, but
should exclude, or limit the weight given to, statisticians or
researchers who are engaged for financial reasons or those who
engage with actuarial risk assessments for purely policy rea-
sons. The first limitation on financial motivations should dis-
count evidence from researchers who have created actuarial
risk assessments tools for commercial uses as well as those
who have tested these tools using funds from a commercial
provider. The second limitation of ideological investment may
be more difficult to outline, given that many researchers creat-
ing specific tools are doing so with the hopes that it will reduce
incarceration rates.
Courts have typically noted that general acceptance is
needed with respect to both the theory and the methodology of
the technique.14 5 Evidence-based sentencing uses group sta-
tistics to create an individual prediction. This group to individ-
ual prediction (G2i) is common throughout many different
fields.1 4 6 The methodology of evidence-based sentencing in-
volves the development of the sample to create the predictive
test, the variables chosen, and the interpretation of results
typically through logistic regression,1 47 which, given the
amount of diverse predictive tools,148 has been generally ac-
cepted. At its broadest, logistic regression resulting in individ-
ual prediction of an individual is generally accepted as an
appropriate technique when analyzing a dichotomous depen-
dent variable.1 4 9
144 See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995)
(noting that general acceptance of hair analysis should not be based off "hair
experts who are generally technicians testifying for the prosecution," but rather
"scientists who can objectively evaluate such evidence").
145 United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 562 (6th Cir. 1993).
146 See G2L, supra note 141, at 421-22 (describing G21 examples such as in
medicine, where research regarding at what age women should begin having
annual mammograms, provides an empirical framework to help doctors make
individual decisions and help manage the risks of breast cancer in individual
patients, and in meteorology, where group data models the trajectory and severity
of storms to help determine whether to evacuate a community due to the threat of
a particular storm).
147 See, e.g., Chanenson & Hyatt, supra note 129, at 9 (explaining the method-
ology of Pennsylvania's evidence-based sentencing).
148 PA. COMM'N ON SENT'G, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT INTERIM REPORT 1:
REVIEW OF FACTORS USED IN RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS app. C (2011).
149 Personal communication with John Zipp (Jan. 2, 2017). See JEFFERY T.
ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING: COURT COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 43 (Austin T. Turk ed., 1997) ("Although other techniques for modeling
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Though not a legal question, what remains to be generally
accepted is the question: Who should decide the policy ratio-
nales for evidence-based sentencing, and which goals of evi-
dence-based sentencing to promote?
IV
DAUBERT'S INTERACTION WITH FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 403
Interestingly, most courts tend not to consider the Daubert
factors in a step-by-step analysis.15 0 Instead, one study found
that the best predictor of whether evidence would be admissi-
ble was, inter alia, whether the evidence was prejudicial. This
section focuses on prejudicial information through the lens of
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 acts as a final check on the
Daubert analysis. Even if a scientific technique passes the
Daubert analysis of reliability and fit, Federal Rule of Evidence
403 may disallow testimony if the probative value is substan-
tially outweighed for many reasons. 15 1 With regards to evi-
dence-based sentencing, the danger of creating unfair
prejudice or confusing the jury would substantially outweigh
its probative value. Evidence-based sentencing creates a risk
of unfair prejudice by using immutable factors outside of the
defendant's control. 1 5 2 It also confuses the jury members, who
do not engage in appropriate critical inquiries about its scien-
tific validity. 153
Although a typical evidence-based sentencing analysis
contains many questionable factors unrelated to the crime,1 5 4
the subsequent analysis will focus on sex and age. These two
categories are analyzed for two reasons. First, the Penn-
sylvania Commission on Sentencing analyzed the efficacy of its
dichotomous dependent variables exist . .. logistic regression is widely held to be
the most appropriate procedure.").
150 A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Stud-
ies Tell Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 109, 133 (2005).
151 FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.").
152 See IMPACT OF REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, supra note 83, at 1. See
also Starr, supra note 1, at 829 ("[A] generalization about a behavioral tendency
like criminal recidivism is simply not comparable to a physical difference ... [and]
certain kinds of generalizations (including those concerning gender) are particu-
larly socially harmful or expressively invidious, even if they have statistical
support.").
153 Adventures in Risk, supra note 78, at 56-57.
154 Starr, supra note 1, at 805.
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evidence-based sentencing model when demographic factors
were removed, thus showing the relative "costs" in terms of
accuracy of not including such questionable factors.15 5 Be-
cause the Commission only conducted this analysis on the risk
assessment tool based on the 1998 to 2000 development model
(and not the tool used for the final proposed risk assess-
ment),1 56 the figures discussed below may not correspond ex-
actly to the current proposed risk assessment tools.
Regardless, the general concepts, critiques, and concerns re-
main the same.
Additionally, each of these categories touches on a consti-
tutional issue or an issue of concern for the court. The inclu-
sion of sex in evidence-based sentencing creates an equal
protection issue subject to heightened scrutiny.1 5 7 Age, al-
though not a protected class and subject to only rational basis
review, has been considered by the Supreme Court, particu-
larly when focusing on the sentencing of juvenile offenders.15 8
It should be noted that the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing's review of these factors was prompted by the con-
stitutional, ethical, and fairness issues raised by Sonja Starr in
Sentencing by Numbers and Evidence-Based Sentencing and
the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination.15 9 Despite the
concerns and their moderate accuracy, the Pennsylvania Com-
mission on Sentencing has recommended keeping these factors
in current and future risk assessment models.16 0
A. Sex
Sex is commonly used in evidence-based sentencing and
results in harsher sentences for men.161 Within the Penn-
sylvania Commission on Sentencing's eight Offender Gravity
155 IMPACT OF REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, supra note 83, at 1.
156 VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAVnY SCORE, supra note 80, at 21-22.
157 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.").
158 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that mandatory
life without parole for a juvenile convicted of murder is unconstitutional): Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79-80 (2010) (ruling that life imprisonment without parole
for non-homicide offenses committed by juveniles is unconstitutional); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005) (holding that the death penalty for
juveniles is unconstitutional due to their lack of culpability relative to adults).
159 IMPACT OF REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, supra note 83, at 1.
160 Id. at 1-2.
161 See Massie, supra note 25, at 522.
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Categoriesl 62 that use sex in their risk assessment, sex ac-
counts for 1-5% of the risk model's prediction of recidivism.163
In evaluating whether sex could be removed from the risk as-
sessment model, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
concluded, "[E]ven though removing [sex] ... would impact the
utility of the scale to a much lesser extent [than age], 164 since
[it] do[es] provide some increase in the recidivism prediction, it
would be worth keeping [it] in the scale as well."1 65 Removing
sex would result in females appearing to have higher recidivism
rates, and males appearing to have lower recidivism rates, as
opposed to how these statistics appear in the original scale.
In its most recent validation of Risk Assessment Instru-
ment by Offense Gravity Score [OGS] for All Offenders for the
2004-2006 development sample, male defendants all scored
one point higher than female defendants.1 6 6 Given that the
total risk scores range from eight to nineteen depending upon
the defendant's OGS category, sex carries a substantial weight
on the severity of one's sentence.
Despite the fact that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
explicitly forbid sex as a sentencing consideration and that
case law regarding the use of sex in non-evidence-based sen-
tencing proceedings is clear, '6 7 the revised Model Penal Code
encourages the inclusion of sex as a factor while offering no
equal protection analysis as to why it would be acceptable.16 8
162 The current proposed risk assessment tool for "Any Crime" and "Crime
Against a Person" take sex into consideration for seven and six Offender Gravity
Categories, respectively. PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, § 305.7(a)-(b).
163 IMPACT OF REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, supra note 83, at 5.
164 See infra subpart IV.B discussion on Age.
165 IMPACT OF REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, supra note 83, at 1.
166 VALIDATION BY OFFENSE GRAvITY SCORE, supra note 80, at 19.
167 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1. 10 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2012). The few times this issue has arisen, courts have ruled that basing
sentences on sex is unconstitutional. See Starr, supra note 1, at 824 (citing
United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974); Williams v. Currie,
103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and
Gender as Explicit Sentencing Factors, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 137, n.68
(2010)).
168 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter's note at 62 (AM. LAw INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011); Starr, supra note 1, at 824 (noting that "the MPC
drafters ... offer no commentary defending [the inclusion of sex] on constitutional
grounds, as though its constitutionality is self-evident"). The Model Penal Code
does note that referring to one's race or ethnicity during sentencing would be
unconstitutional. Despite the omission of a seemingly important distinction be-
tween the difference in constitutionality of race and sex, the Code was passed in
2011 and remains the same in the Third Tentative Draft. MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING xii (AM. LAw INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014).
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This is troubling, because an equal protection analysis
would suggest otherwise.1 6 9 Under intermediate scrutiny, dis-
tinctions made on the basis of sex must serve "important gov-
ernmental objectives and [ ] the discriminatory means
employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives." 170 This discrimination cannot be based on
"overbroad generalizations" about the differences between men
and women. 17 1 Even when data support an even stronger pre-
dictive empirical relationship than evidence-based sentencing,
the Supreme Court has typically found the discriminatory
means to be unconstitutional.1 7 2 This consistent rejection of a
sex-based distinction calls into question its use during the sen-
tencing procedure.
B. Age
Age is the most important demographic factor predicting
arrest.17 3 In fact, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
found that for each year of increase in age, the likelihood of
169 See Testimony of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, supra note 98,
at 5 (focusing on the Pennsylvania Risk Assessment Instrument and arguing that
it is "unconstitutional to attach demerit points simply because of one's gender").
Some scholars argue that considering a variable subject to intermediate or height-
ened scrutiny along with other variables could be acceptable based on analysis
similar to higher education case law regarding affirmative action. These argu-
ments ignore the fact that many other immutable factors are used in this process,
that the stakes are not simply one's educational opportunity but one's liberty, and
that much of the higher education case law focuses on remedying historical
oppression through measures such as affirmative action. See Oleson, supra note
8, at 1338.
170 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
171 Id. at 532-34.
172 See Starr, supra note 1, at 825-26 (noting that cases, such as Craig v.
Boren, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, and F'rontiero v. Richardson showed that strong
statistical data between different sexes did not convince the Court of the constitu-
tionality of classifying by sex based on stereotyping). In Craig, men were ten times
more likely to be arrested for drunk driving than women. Despite this finding, the
Court ruled that the drinking law's distinction based on sex was unconstitutional.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In Weinberger and Frontlero, women
were much more likely to be financially dependent on their husbands (in the
1970s) than the other way around. Despite this finding, the Court ruled that a
financially-dependent man was entitled to his wife's benefits. See Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
690-91 (1973).
173 "Age was the most important demographic factor predicting arrest." IMPACT
OF REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, supra note 83, at 1. It is unclear whether this
refers to a first or second arrest.
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recidivism decreases by roughly 5%. 174 Within the Penn-
sylvania Commission on Sentencing's nine OGS, age accounts
for 21-30% of the risk model's prediction of recidivism. 175 In
evaluating whether it could remove this demographic factor
from the analysis, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentenc-
ing concluded, "[The removal of that factor would have the
most impact on recidivism prediction and scale accuracy."17 6 If
age were removed, older offenders would appear to have higher
recidivism rates, whereas younger offenders would appear to
have lower recidivism rates as compared to the original
scale. 177
In its most recent validation of Risk Assessment Instru-
ment by OGS for All Offenders for the 2004-2006 development
sample, defendants under the age of 21 or younger scored
three to five points higher than defendants aged 49 or older. 178
Given that the total risk scores range from eight to nineteen
depending upon the defendant's OGS category, age carries a
significant weight on the severity of one's sentence. The
younger a defendant is, the longer their sentence will be.
This result contradicts the Supreme Court's recent juris-
prudence surrounding adolescents. Beginning in 2005, the
Supreme Court recognized that adolescents are categorically
less culpable than adults.1 7 9 Much of the Supreme Court's
logic in subsequent decisions involving juveniles was based off
of amici briefs showing that "developments in psychology and
brain science continue to show fundamental differences be-
tween juvenile and adult minds." 1s0 This scientific evidence
notes, "Risk taking [including criminal activity] ... is so perva-
sive that it 'is statistically aberrant to refrain from such behav-
174 FACTORS THAT PREDICT RECIDIVISM, supra note 92, at 9. The author finds it
highly unlikely that the researchers intended to convey a linear effect, particularly
given that age is grouped into categories.
175 IMPACT OF REMOVING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, supra note 83, at 5.
176 Id. at 19.
177 Id. at 9.
178 VALIDATION OF OFFENSE GRAVIY SCORE, supra note 80, at 19.
179 "[Plsychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds" making their actions "less likely to be evidence
of 'irretrievably depraved character' than are the actions of adults." Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72, 490 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 570 (2005)).
180 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
752 [Vol. 103:723
EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING
tor during adolescence.'" 8 1 Both the Supreme Court and amict
focus on young persons' potential for rehabilitation.1 82
Because the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing in-
sists on including age in its risk assessment tool, age creates
an unfair prejudice. Even though younger people are arguably
both legally and scientifically less culpable and more amenable
to rehabilitation than their older counterparts, they will likely
spend more time in prison.
V
PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
Proponents of evidence-based sentencing laud it as the so-
lution for discrimination, overcrowding, and budget
shortages.' 8 3 The discussion on its scientific strength above
should serve as a warning that evidence-based sentencing may
not be the most effective solution.
There are four major penological theories: retribution, de-
terrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.18 4 Over time, the
purpose of punishment and prison sentences has shifted from
rehabilitation, where prisons serve as a way to prepare individ-
uals for return to society, to deterrence and incapacitation.1 85
Evidence-based sentencing puts incapacitation at the front
and center of the debate. Because recidivism is the focus of
evidence-based sentencing, the idea is that the public will be
protected while the defendant is imprisoned and thus
incapacitated.
Actuarial risk assessments give a simple numerical value-
a percentage with questionable accuracy-to answer what ap-
pears to the lay person to be the probability that a person will
recidivate.' 8 6 This does not provide information about when or
how they will recidivate. This snapshot is provided to us after a
plea or a trial, but before sentencing, and ignores the many
factors that can impact recidivism after and during an individ-
181 Brief for the American Medical Association et al., as Amid Curiae Support-
ing Respondents at 5, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) (quot-
ing L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Marufestations,
24 NEUROSCIENCE & BEHAV. REVS. 417, 421 (2000)).
182 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 483 (noting that mandatory punishment "disregards
the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances [(juvenile brain de-
velopment and culpability)] most suggest it").
183 See Starr, supra note 1, at 816.
184 See Oleson, supra note 8, at 1330-32.
185 See Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between
Rhetoric and Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 L. & SOC'Y REv. 33, 34 (2011).
186 Indeed, what qualifies as recidivism is hard to define. See supra subpart
III.B (Prong I: Whether Evidence-Based Sentencing Has been Tested?).
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ual's incarceration (including family ties' 8 7 and prison educa-
tion programs'88 ). Using a single percentage generated by a
risk assessment tool does not reduce recidivism; rather, it pro-
vides a false feeling of creating a "just" criminal justice system,
while failing to rehabilitate and help offenders transition back
into society.
CONCLUSION
Despite its purported positive impact on the criminal jus-
tice system, evidence-based sentencing risks fooling judges
and juries and further contributing to the overrepresentation of
men of color and poor people in prisons. The problems with the
creation of these models, namely a lack of replication, poten-
tially unconstitutional use of certain factors, high false positive
rates, and issues with G2i abstraction, should all create seri-
ous concerns for actors in and around the criminal justice
system.
The Daubert test offers an analytical framework through
which the validity and fit of evidence-based sentencing can be
evaluated. As a general matter, evidence-based sentencing can
and has been tested, but rigor should be applied to sample
selection and methods. Peer review should be decided on a
case-by-case basis and free from conflicts of interest. The high
error rates of specific evidence-based sentencing tools are con-
cerning, particularly with the inability to pinpoint what a large
effect size is. Finally, the method of using logistic regression for
individual prediction is a generally accepted statistical tech-
nique, but the weight to give such information has not been
established. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing's
current proposal does not pass the first three prongs of
Daubert, and general acceptance could be argued either way
depending on the scope of analysis. Even if Pennsylvania's
evidence-based sentencing regime did pass the Daubert test,
the prejudicial nature of using sex and age would disallow evi-
dence-based sentencing. Whether this sentencing technique
would be appropriate without such factors remains an open
question.
It will be hard to measure the impact of Pennsylvania's risk
assessment tools when they go into effect on July 1, 2018. The
two risk assessment tools for a future offense of "Any Crime" or
187 Mark T. Berg & Beth M. Huebner, Reentry and the Ties that BldL An
Examination of Social Ties, Employment, and Recidivism, 28 JUST. Q., 382, 383
(2011).
188 From class discussion through the Cornell Prison Education Program.
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"A Crime Against a Person" may sometimes result in an of-
fender being in different risk groups depending on the test
applied. 18 9 The guidelines offer no explanation on how to rec-
oncile these two outcomes or whether further information is
needed if just one of the risk assessments results in a low or
high risk. Measuring the outcome of seeking further informa-
tion for low- or high-risk assessments may be difficult as the
judge may order either "a PSI report that contains risk-needs-
responsivity information" or "the preparation of an RNA or RNR
assessment."o9 0 After considering its methodological and con-
stitutional shortcomings, it is unclear whether Pennsylvania's
new risk assessment tools will truly result in "smarter sentenc-
ing," and whether we will know what it did at all.
189 PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, supra note 85, § 305.9, Risk Assessment Summary
(the Commission failed to label § 305.9 in the original report).
190 Id. § 305.5(c).
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